Infrastructure regulation and reallocations within industry: Theory and evidence from Indian firms

Publication year: 2011 Source: Journal of Development Economics, Available online 26 October 2011 Juan Pablo Rud Many firms in developing countries adopt captive power generators to deal with expensive and unreliable supply of electricity. I present a model that combines upstream regulation with downstream heterogeneous firms in a monopolistic competition framework, where firms can pay a fixed cost to adopt this marginal cost-reducing device

Publication year: 2011 Source: Journal of Development Economics, Available online 26 October 2011 Juan Pablo Rud Many firms in developing countries adopt captive power generators to deal with expensive and unreliable supply of electricity. I present a model that combines upstream regulation with downstream heterogeneous firms in a monopolistic competition framework, where firms can pay a fixed cost to adopt this marginal cost-reducing device

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Infrastructure regulation and reallocations within industry: Theory and evidence from Indian firms